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This study provides evidence on the significant investment value of analyst recommenda-
tions on newly public companies. The sample of this study comprises of 1,825 initial public 
offerings conducted 2010 to 2018 in NASDAQ, NYSE and NYSE American exchanges. I doc-
ument that investment strategy following consensus recommendations by purchasing (sell-
ing short) stocks with most (least) favorable consensus recommendations yields significant 
monthly abnormal gross return of 1.6 percent. Moreover, this predictive power of consensus 
recommendations appears to be more pronounced for post-IPO stock performance in the 
first subsequent year of the IPO. 
In turn, the investment value of underwriter analysts’ recommendations is inferior to con-
sensus recommendations as the recommendations of affiliated analysts do not produce sig-
nificant excess returns.  
The existing research has not covered the relation between analyst recommendations and 
post-IPO stock performance. However, the results are consistent with the prior research 
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Equity research has historically been a profitable business for investment banks, but recently the 
industry has been facing substantial transformation while the buy side has increasingly moved to 
produce its own research instead of buying services from brokerage analysts. Consequently, the 
demand for analyst coverage, provided by investment banks and other third-party research providers, 
have decreased considerably throughout the 2010s, and the number of analysts at major investment 
banks have dropped by 20% since 2010. Also, the recent regulation, especially MiFID II, effective 
on 3 January 2018, have increased the reluctance of the buy side to spend on the third-party research. 
(Monk, 2018) Nevertheless, as of 2017, the aggregate size of the global equity market was $16 billion 
with more than 40,000 every-day reports (Financial Times, 2017). For the buy side the question is 
whether third-party analysts can create value to them or not.  
 
While the buy side is weighing in their mind whether produce research in-house or buy it as a service, 
many private investors still rely on analyst recommendation, especially on publicly available 
consensus recommendations. That is, often small private investors have not educated themselves in 
finance matters and even if they are educated, analysts presumably possess more in-depth information 
on companies they follow. This presumption is relevant as analysts e.g. tend to have regular analyst 
calls with company representatives. Therefore, it is natural that analyst recommendations have weight 
when private investors are allocating their investments. Thus, it can be argued that analyst 
performance has economic significance. 
 
One special occasion, when public information is rather restricted, and equity researchers may have 
particular insight on firm performance, is companies which have recently undertaken an initial public 
offering (IPO). In case of newly public firm, analyst coverage is vital for both company and investors. 
First, Michaely and Womack (1999) state that most new firms are not known in the market, and thus 
they believe their market value will be enhancing as soon as the coverage is initiated. Second, 
investors value a precise information provided by analysts as all the details, and e.g. the historical 
performance, of newly public firm is not publicly available. IPO aftermarket is highly volatile and 
there is evidence of positive early term and negative longer-run stock performance.1 Therefore, it is 
                                               
1 Ritter (1991) documents an average cumulative firm-adjusted return of -15.08% in the three years following the 
issuance for 1,526 IPOs during 1975-1984. 
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conceivable that many investors count on analyst recommendations when a company has recently 
undertaken IPO. On the other hand, to assess the reasonability of relying on analysts, must be asked: 
is there evidence on superior analyst performance in the difficult IPO aftermarket? 
 
In the IPO aftermarket one potentially influencing factor is whether an analyst is affiliated or 
unaffiliated analyst. In this context, affiliated analyst is a synonym for underwriter analyst, which 
means that analyst represents the investment bank which has underwritten an IPO. There is a 
considerable conflict of interest between bank’s corporate finance and brokerage sections, which 
may affect the credibility of underwriter analysts’ recommendations. The corporate finance section 
is responsible for serving bank’s corporate clients in completing transactions, such as equity 
offerings, mergers and acquisitions. The brokerage section and its equity research department, on 
the other hand, aims at providing clients with accurate and objective information on companies. 
However, corporate finance clients benefit from optimistic research and there is a strict competition 
for underwriting mandates. E.g. Ljunqvist et al. (2006) find that economic incentives affect analyst 
recommendations, albeit analyst behavior does not significantly increase the probability of winning 
underwriting mandates.  
 
Michaely and Womack (1999) state that for investment banks the IPO-market is a lucrative 
playground. They state that in the underwriter-issuer relation is an implicit presumption that 
underwriter will provide the newly issued security with an analyst coverage and do that by producing 
positive reports. As discussed above, this analyst coverage is vital for newly public companies. 
Overall, corporate finance is a huge business for investment banks and there is implicit pressure on 
analysts to release favorable recommendations on investment banking clients or potential clients. 
Even the selection of covered firms can be affected. Morgan Stanley internal memo (Wall Street 
Journal, July 14, 1992), extracted from the research paper of Michaely and Womack (1999) a), 
illustrates that: “Our objective… is to adopt a policy, fully understood by the entire firm, including 
the Research Department, that we do not make negative or controversial comments about our clients 
as a matter of sound business practice.” More recently, Dechow et al. (2010) find a positive relation 
between the level of underwriter analysts’ growth forecasts and the fees paid to their employees. 
Moreover, Hong and Kubik (2003) note that promotions of affiliated analysts are more dependent on 
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optimism than accuracy of their recommendations. All this raise a question, are underwriter analyst 
recommendations positively biased? 
 
All these questions steer us further into the big question: can analysts forecast future stock 
performance? In this research paper I focus on the aforementioned special occasion and therefore I 
examine analyst recommendations and post-IPO stock performance. Also, underwriter analysts’ 
conflict of interest is under my investigation due to its significance in the IPO aftermarket. This study 
aims at answering the following questions: can analysts forecast post-IPO stock performance and 
does underwriter analysts’ conflict of interest affect the investment value of their recommendations?  
 
Analysts’ ability to predict post-IPO stock returns, as such, is not covered in the existing research. 
However, Barber et al. (2001) find that, in general, purchasing (selling short) stocks with the most 
(least) favorable recommendations, in conjunction with daily portfolio rebalancing and timely 
response, yield annual abnormal gross returns greater than 4%. This result indicates that analysts 
possess an ability to predict stock performance. The historical performance of analyst 
recommendations is used as an approach also in my study. Moreover, Ritter (1991) documents an 
average cumulative firm-adjusted return of -15.08% in the three years following the issuance for 
1,526 IPOs during 1975-1984. Furthermore, he finds the underperformance to be more significant for 
young growth companies and for companies going public in a hot IPO market. 
 
Underwriter analysts’ conflict of interest is widely-acknowledged and well-examined phenomenon, 
but underwriter analyst performance has received only little attention in the existing research. 
However, Iskoz (2004) documents the performance of underwriter analysts’ strong buy-
recommendations inferior to the unaffiliated ones. Also, Michaely and Womack (1999) find the long 
run post-recommendation performance of underwriter analyst recommendations to be significantly 
worse than the performance of unaffiliated analysts’ buy-recommendations. They document a 
difference in size-adjusted buy-and-hold returns between underwriters and unaffiliated groups of 
more than 50% when holding period is two years. However, the long-term and short-term 





I build my hypothesis based on the prior research. Therefore, the hypothesis is that despite the 
volatility and long-term underperformance of initial public offerings, analysts possess predictive 
power on post-IPO stock performance. Moreover, I hypothesize that the investment value of 
underwriter analysts’ recommendations is inferior to the consensus recommendations. The 
motivation for that is that the existing research suggests that underwriters tend to issue more favorable 
recommendations, especially when they should issue negative recommendations.2 
 
The approach of this study is similar to the one used by Barber et al. (2001). First, I collect data on 
initial public offerings conducted 2010 to 2018 in NASDAQ, NYSE and NYSE American exchanges 
from the SDC Platinum. Then, I merge this data with the recommendations data which is retrieved 
from Thomson Reuters’ Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) database. Next, daily returns 
for these stocks are extracted from the Compustat North America Daily Security database. The 
predictive power and investment value is examined by constructing portfolios of stocks grouped by 
valid analyst recommendations. Then, I study long-short portfolios purchasing (selling short) stocks 
with most (least) favorable recommendations in the three subsequent years of the IPO. Finally, the 
performance of these portfolios is measured by applying both the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and the five-factor model provided by Fama and French (1993). 
 
I find that the long-short portfolio for consensus recommendations produces positive and significant 
monthly excess return of 1.6 percent, gross of transactions costs. In turn, long-short portfolio formed 
on the basis of underwriter analysts’ recommendations does not earn statistically significant excess 
return. Moreover, I find abnormal monthly return of 2.5 percent for consensus long-short portfolio 
when a holding period is the first subsequent year instead of the original three years following the 
IPO. 
 
I draw three main findings from these results. First, analysts can forecast post-IPO stock performance. 
Second, the investment value of underwriter analysts’ recommendations is inferior to consensus 
recommendations. Third, this predictive power of analyst recommendations on post-IPO stock 
performance appears to be most pronounced in the first subsequent year of the IPO. The structure of 
                                               
2 E.g. Michaely and Womack (1999) find that affiliated analysts rate stocks overly favorably based on their own EPS 
estimates when compared to unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations and EPS estimates. 
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this paper is as follows: (I) Literature review, (II) Data and methodology, (III) Results and (IV) 
Conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
A. Analyst recommendations 
 
Theoretical background for analyst recommendations as such, is broad. One thing potentially adding 
value of analyst recommendations is a market reaction to recommendations and the post-
recommendation stock price drift. Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996) show that favorable 
(unfavorable) changes in recommendations are accompanied with instant positive (negative) returns. 
Moreover, Womack find post-recommendation stock price drift which is longer (shorter) for 
downgrades (upgrades), lasting up to six months (one month). Additionally, Jegadeesh and Kim 
(2006) state that both stock price reaction and stock price drift are largest in the US, which is also the 
geographic scope of my research. Nevertheless, they find indication that the most likely explanation 
for the largest effect on stock prices is the US analysts’ skills at finding mispriced stocks. Furthermore, 
Green (2006) finds that early access to the pre-market release of analyst recommendations provides 
brokerage firm clients with roughly 30% of positive abnormal returns since early reaction permits 
clients to benefit from the stock market reaction.  
 
When evaluating the investment value of analyst recommendations, analyst behavior must be taken 
into consideration. First, Conrad et al. (2006) find that analysts’ response to large changes in stock 
price depends on the direction of change. Their finding is that analysts are equally likely to upgrade 
or downgrade after large stock price increases. However, after large stock price declines analysts tend 
to downgrade with higher probability. Second, as Jegadeesh and Kim (2009) state, analysts tend to 
herd around consensus, and therefore the more considerable the deviation from the consensus is, the 
larger is the stock price reaction. This herding behavior is stronger when the analyst is from large 
brokerage, they make less frequent revisions or the dispersion across recommendations on the 




B. Post-IPO stock returns 
 
In the context of this study, there are two remarkable viewpoints on initial public offerings. First, 
post-IPO stock performance, as such, is a widely-covered theme in the existing research. Three 
commonly acknowledged anomalies have been discovered: (i) new issue underpricing, (ii) cycles in 
the extent of underpricing and (iii) long-run underperformance. The portfolios constructed in this 
study does not benefit from underpricing, but long-run performance of initial public offerings is of 
my interest.  
 
Carter et al. (1998) find that the long-run underperformance is less severe for companies taken public 
by more reputable underwriters. Moreover, Rajan and Servaes (2012) find the stocks for which 
analysts estimates a high growth potential, to have lower returns in the long run. Therefore, they 
suggest that the long-run underperformance of IPOs is partially driven by overoptimism. However, 
also the finding of Jain and Kini (1995) that there is a significant decline in operative performance 
after IPO, can be seen as a plausible explanation for the long-run underperformance of IPOs.  
 
Second, according to the existing research, stock performance appears to be related to analyst 
coverage. Das et al. (2006) draw residual analyst coverage from the model of initial analyst coverage 
and find an evidence that companies with high residual coverage have significantly better returns and 
operating performance in the three years following the IPO than the companies with low residual 
coverage. They justify the results by the reluctance of analysts to issue negative recommendations 
and suggest that analysts preferably discontinue coverage when a sell-recommendation is warranted.  
 
Moreover, so called quiet period is an important concept in examining the relationship between post-
IPO stock returns and analyst recommendations. That is, syndicated members cannot comment on 
valuation during the quiet period and therefore until the end of the quiet period typically all the 
information available for investors are prospectus and audited financial information. Bradley et al. 
(2006) find that at the end of the quiet period, analyst coverage is almost exclusively initiated by 
underwriter analyst. Furthermore, contrary to the previous evidence, they find that underpricing does 
not have an effect on analyst coverage in the first year and there is no relation between the number 




C. Underwriter analysts’ conflict of interest 
 
Multiple researches have been done on conflict of interest of underwriter analysts. Michaely and 
Womack (1999) find that in the month after the end of the quiet period, affiliated analysts issue 50% 
more buy recommendations than unaffiliated analysts. Moreover, Michaely and Womack note that 
buy recommendations of underwriter analysts were accompanied with 2.7% initial size-adjusted 
excess return versus 4.4% for unaffiliated analysts’ buy recommendations. However, both of these 
excess returns were significantly different from zero. 
 
This is consistent with the findings of Lin and McNichols (1998) who find underwriter analysts’ 
recommendations to be more favorable albeit their earnings estimates are not significantly higher 
than unaffiliated analysts’ ones. In addition, they document three-day returns to underwriters’ hold-
recommendations which are significantly more negative than hold-recommendations of other 
brokerage firms. They suggest that market considers underwriters to issue more likely a hold-
recommendation when ‘sell’ is warranted. Also, Dechow et al. (2010) find that affiliated analysts 
tend to issue most optimistic growth forecasts. 
 
Also, underwriter analysts have been found to provide “booster shots” if the stock is experiencing 
poor aftermarket performance. Michaely and Womack (1999) document that characteristic for 
underwriter buy recommendations is that they are preceded by falling stock prices whereas non-
underwriters are more likely to issue buy recommendation for stocks which are increasing in price. 
Furthermore, James and Karceski (2006) add that in general poor aftermarket performance is 
accompanied with higher target prices in the subsequent six months, and this is more pronounced for 
target prices issued by underwriter analysts. In addition, O’Brien et al. (2005) find that affiliated 
analysts are slower to downgrade from buy- and hold-recommendations and significantly faster to 
upgrade from hold-recommendations after IPO. Also, they note that underwriter analysts retain 
coverage more persistently while unaffiliated analysts are more likely to drop coverage.  
 
However, also information asymmetry and a superior information advantage of underwriter analysts, 
gained by completing due diligence process and maintaining good relationship with the client firm, 
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is a convincing explanation for underwriter analysts’ recommendations which are significantly away 
from consensus. After controlling for recommendation characteristics and timing, Bradley et al. (2006) 
find no evidence that the market discounts underwriter analyst recommendations. Also, excluding 
recommendations issued initially after the initial public offering, Dunbar et al. (1997) find 
significantly more positive market reaction to underwriter analysts’ buy-recommendations compared 
to unaffiliated ones. They conclude that indicating that market judge underwriter analysts to possess 
superior information on the companies they have taken public. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
The data used in this study comes from three different sources. First, I retrieve data on initial public 
offerings undertaken in NASDAQ, NYSE and NYSE American (previously known as AMEX) 
exchanges between years 2010-2018, from the SDC Platinum database. Second, analyst 
recommendations, both consensus and underwriter analysts’ recommendations, for these firms are 
from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). Last, I extract daily post-IPO stock returns 
from the Compustat North America database.  
 
A. IPO data 
 
The sample is comprised of 1,825 initial public offerings conducted 2010 to 2018 in NASDAQ, 
NYSE and NYSE American exchanges. I exclude unit offerings and American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs). Contrary to many prior IPO studies, financial institutions are not excluded since the reasons 
for excluding them are not relevant for this study.3 For these 1,825 companies I collect data on offer 
dates, SIC codes, exchanges, dollar-denominated deal sizes and underwriters. All this data is 
extracted from the SDC Platinum database, through an access provided by Aalto Department of 
Finance. 
                                               
3 The principal reasons for excluding financial institution presented by prior researchers are as follows: First, banks may 
undertake IPO involuntarily in order to meet capital requirements. Second, comparing the operating performance of 
financial institutions and industrial companies is difficult. However, when examining forecasting ability of analysts, 
there is no need for restricting the sample to cover merely the most traditional stocks. Reasons for undertaking IPOs are 
itself a factor that analyst should observe properly and therefore is an affecting factor also in this study. Moreover, 




Table I describes the sample in terms of deal size and industry groups. A majority, total of 53.3 
percent of IPOs, have a deal size between $50 million and $200 million. However, as much as 9.4 
percent of deals are greater than $500 million measured in amount of raised capital and furthermore 
16.2 percent of deals have raised less than $50 million of equity capital. The sample is not limited by 
deal size and thus it includes a minimum deal size of $2.8 million and a maximum deal size of $21,767 
million. Moreover, SDC Platinum does not provide a deal size for 0.5 percent of deals. Can be said, 
that the sample is skewed towards its tails and it is not normally distributed. However, this is 
representative for IPOs undertaken between years 2010 and 2018 and any significant biases resulting 
from the distribution of deal sizes are not observed as analysts are able to select firms to be covered, 
considering deal sizes as given. 
 
Three industries are particularly well-presented in the sample. SIC codes denoted for Manufacturing 
and Finance, Real Estate and Insurance both covers over 30 percent of the sample. Moreover, a share 
of Services companies totals for 22.2 percent. Comparably, the representation of other industries does 
not excess 5.5 percent. Different industries have different developments, but, as this is again 
representative for IPOs conducted in years 2010-2018, there is no need for adjusting the imbalance. 
 
Table II exhibits yearly distribution of the sample with respect to number of initial public offerings 
and exchanges in which stocks are listed. The most represented exchange is NASDAQ with its 
proportion of 57.7 percent of all IPOs undertaken while only 0.9% listings are denoted in NYSE 
American (AMEX). The number of IPOs varies across years and there is not logical pattern observed. 
However, remarkable for this study is that 30.9 percent of newly listed companies have undertaken 
IPO during years 2016-2018, meaning that the original holding period of the three subsequent years 
of the IPO used in this study, does not become covered for these stocks and this may affect results if 









Descriptive Statistics on IPOs, 2010 to 2018 
Panel A describes the sample grouped by deal size in millions. Deal sizes are retrieved from the SDC Platinum 
database. Number of IPOs is a total amount of IPOs undertaken in 2010-2018 meeting the deal size criteria on 
the left. Percent of IPOs is amount of IPOs meeting the criteria as a percentage of the total number of IPOs. 
Nonclassifiable is IPOs for which deal size is not available. 
 
Panel B describes the sample grouped by industry. As a base of grouping is SIC codes, as follows: Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing (0100-0999); Mining (1000-1499); Construction (1500-1799); Manufacturing (2000-3999); 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary service (4000-4999); Wholesale Trade (5000-5199); 
Retail Trade (5200-5999); Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (6000-6799); Services (7000-8999); Public 
Administration (9100-9729). SIC codes are extracted from the SDC Platinum. Number of IPOs is a total amount 
of IPOs undertaken in 2010-2018 meeting the industry criteria on the left. Percent of IPOs is amount of IPOs 







Descriptive Statistics on IPOs and IBES Coverage Ratios, 2010 to 2018 
Number of IPOs includes all companies recorded in the SDC Platinum IPO database for years 2010 to 2018 excluding 
unit offerings and ADRs, by year. Primary exchange is an exchange (NASDAQ/NYSE/AMEX) in which the stock is 
denoted at a time of initial public offering. The IPO data is further merged with the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(IBES) database in order to obtain analyst recommendations for the sample firms. Number of firms having consensus 
recommendation on IBES is aggregated number of listed stocks for which is found at least one consensus recommendation 
on IBES in 2010 to 2018. (In parentheses) is presented the percentage of firms having consensus recommendation in 
relation to the total number of IPOs. In turn, Number of firms having identifiable lead-underwriter recommendation on 
IBES is aggregated number of listed stocks for which is found at least one lead-underwriter recommendation on IBES. 
Information of lead-underwriters is obtained from SDC Platinum IPO database. (In parentheses) is presented the 
percentage of firms having identifiable lead underwriter recommendation in relation to the total number of IPOs. 
 
 
Also, IBES coverage ratios are presented for both consensus and lead-underwriter recommendations 
in Table II. Significantly lower number of firms having identifiable lead-underwriter recommendation 
results primarily from IBES restructuring of identifiers which is effective on October 18, 2018. 4 This 
may lead to a selection bias, which is discussed in more detail when the recommendations data is 
presented. Also, the development of IBES coverage ratios for both consensus and lead-underwriter 
recommendations is decreasing. This is consistent with constantly dropping number of analysts but 
may also be affected by two technical reasons. First, simultaneously with the aforementioned 
restructuring of identifiers, certain brokers decided to exclude their recommendations from the 
                                               
4 As of October 18, 2018 Thomson-Reuters anonymized a large portion of brokers and analysts in IBES. The data 
provider estimates 13.8% of all broker IDs to be reassigned including characteristically large brokerage houses. 
(WRDS, 2019)  
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academic version of IBES. This decision has a possible impact solely on lead-underwriter 
recommendations as consensus recommendations are not affected. Second, the sample includes 25 
companies which have conducted IPO in November, 2018 or December, 2018 and does not have 
neither consensus nor lead-underwriter recommendation by 31 December, 2018. As the initial 
coverage have been provided in the two subsequent months of the IPO for all sample stocks having 
recommendation on IBES, this may indicate that there is no analyst coverage for these stocks as of 
31 December, 2018. Adding these 25 companies to coverage figures would increase the coverage 
ratios of 2018 by 10.2 percentage points. 
 
B. Recommendations data 
 
Recommendations data for the sample firms is fetched from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System 
(IBES) which is a database from Thomson Reuters. IBES has forecast and recommendation 
information on 60,000 companies across over 100 markets. More than 3,000 brokerages contribute 
to the database. Thomson Reuters has certain principles in treating recommendations data. It consider 
a recommendation to be stopped if it is not updated or confirmed for 180 days. Moreover, 
recommendations which have not been updated for 105 days are excluded from consensus 
recommendations data. However, Thomson Reuters maintain also recommendations which have 
already been stopped and data on companies not existing anymore. That is done in order to avoid 
survivorship bias. (WRDS, 2019) 
 
Consensus recommendations for the sample firms are extracted from the IBES summary history 
which is updated monthly based on individual analysts’ recommendations. 5 Consensus 
recommendations are obtained for 1,466 companies, totaling for 80.3 percent of the sample and 
63,693 consensus recommendations. In addition to company identifiers, consensus recommendations 
data retrieved from IBES, includes dates for recommendation updates, mean recommendations, 
median recommendations, standard deviations of individual analysts’ recommendations and numbers 
of analysts covering the firm. I consider mean recommendation as a consensus recommendation as 
mean is more robust measure than median and therefore consistent with the findings of e.g. Jegadeesh 
                                               
5 “…the snapshots are as of the Thursday before the third Friday of every month” (WRDS, 2019) 
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and Kim (2009) and Loh and Stulz (2010) that a recommendation change is more influential when it 
is issued away from consensus. Moreover, mean recommendations are also more easily available for 
small private investors than median recommendations and thus presumably more reflected in price. 
Also, the consensus data is merged with the IBES stopped recommendations data in order to identify 
omitted stocks and dates of dropped analyst coverage. 
 
Individual analyst recommendations for the sample firms are extracted from the IBES detailed 
estimates which are updated each day as they are released by analysts. Again, additional data is 
collected including activation dates of recommendations, estimator IDs and IBES recommendation 
codes. The IBES recommendation code is a consistent measure for the level of recommendation 
provided by Thomson Reuters. The rendition of IBES recommendation code is as follows: 1 (Strong 
Buy), 2 (Buy), 3 (Hold), 4 (Sell) and 5 (Strong Sell) and hence this classification is used in this 
research paper. 
 
The individual analyst recommendations are further merged with the information of lead underwriters, 
retrieved from the SDC Platinum, in order to filter individual analyst recommendations data to cover 
exclusively lead underwriter recommendations. However, as discussed above, as a result of the IBES 
data restructuring, a large portion of estimators is unidentifiable. Nevertheless, I construct a method 
to identify ten of thirteen investment banks appearing most as a lead underwriter. For constructing 
the method, I use an assumption that lead underwriter most likely is the one initiating coverage and 
also more persistently maintain coverage for the company. These assumptions are consistent with e.g. 
the findings of Bradley et al. (2006) and O’Brien et al. (2005).6 That would result in significantly 
higher frequency between certain estimator codes and underwriters, and subsequently enables me to 
match estimators to underwriters with significantly higher frequencies. The method, and a rationale 
for it, is presented more in detail in Appendix I. After applying the method, identifiable estimator IDs 
is obtained for 47 percent of lead underwriters. Furthermore, the identified underwriters have taken 
public, as a lead underwriter, as many as 74.2 percent of the sample firms. Lead underwriter 
                                               
6 Bradley et al. (2006) find that the initial coverage is almost exclusively provided by underwriter analysts. Moreover, 
O’Brien et al. (2005) note that underwriter analysts maintain coverage more persistently while unaffiliated analysts are 
more likely to drop the coverage. Also, the conventional wisdom suggests that underwriter analysts provide the 
coverage for firms they have taken public as a compensation for underpricing. 
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recommendations is obtained for 786 companies, totaling for 43.1 percent of the sample and 3,534 
lead underwriter recommendations. 
 
The characters of these two datasets, consensus and underwriter recommendations, differ to some 
extent and therefore may cause biases if not addressed properly. First, Thomson Reuters’ updating 
frequencies are different for these datasets. Therefore, in addition to the original results, also the 
results when matching more frequent underwriter recommendations to the dates of consensus data 
updates, are discussed in the Results-section. Second, after applying the method to identify lead 
underwriters’ estimator IDs, large investment banks are over-represented in underwriter analyst 
recommendations data in relation to mid-sized investment banks which are largely unidentified. 
Referring Loh and Stulz (2010) who find that most reputable analysts outperform less reputable 
analysts, this may result in positively biased performance of underwriter analysts. This is discussed 
in more detail when the results are presented. 
 
Table III presents descriptive statistics by year for both consensus and lead underwriter 
recommendations. It reveals remarkably increasing development in number of recommendations for 
both types of recommendations.  That is natural since the number of listed companies increases year 
by year and they are not excluded from the recommendation data unless the coverage is dropped. The 
frequency of lead underwriter recommendation revisions is on average 81 days. Also, both yearly 
means and yearly medians are presented for number of analysts covering firms. Table reveals that 
medians are almost consistently smaller than means, indicating that the distribution of number of 
analysts is skewed towards large numbers of analysts. Accordingly, the maximum analyst coverage 
is as high as 52 analysts. Less favorable average recommendations of lead underwriters versus 
consensus recommendations is also worth of notion as it is more or less in conflict with the prior 
research. 
 
Table IV provides a view on analyst recommendations presented by years after undertaking the initial 
public offering. Three characteristics of analyst recommendations are worth of highlighting in the 
context of this study. First, recommendations are more likely to be favorable when there is no much 
time gone by after IPO. Especially, during the first year subsequent of IPO both consensus and lead 





Descriptive Statistics on Analyst Recommendations, Consensus and Lead Underwriter 
Number of consensus recommendations includes all consensus recommendations issued on sample firms in the year in 
question. Analysts per covered firm is the number of individual analysts following a firm and it is presented as both mean 
and median, by year. Average consensus recommendation is mean of all consensus recommendations issued in the year 
in question. Recommendations are classified as follows: 1 (Strong Buy), 2 (Buy), 3 (Hold), 4 (Sell) and 5 (Strong Sell). 
Number of lead-underwriter recommendations includes all identifiable lead-underwriter recommendations issued on 
sample firms in the year in question. Average lead-underwriter recommendation is mean of all lead-underwriter 




70 percent of the first year consensus recommendations and 67 percent of the first year lead 
underwriter recommendations are lower than 2.00 signifying a recommendation of Strong Buy (1) or 
Buy (2). Meanwhile, the portions of sell-recommendations (higher than 3.00) of consensus and lead 
underwriters are 1 percent and 2 percent, respectively. However, the trend of buy-recommendations, 
especially ‘strong buys’, is decreasing with time, while the amount of sell-recommendations increases 
moderately. If this reallocation of recommendations is in line with aftermarket stock performance, 
this is consistent with the prior research suggesting that long term post-IPO performance is poor. 
 
Second, surprisingly underwriter analysts are less favorable in their recommendations than consensus. 
Overall, underwriters issue 48 percent hold or sell –recommendations whereas only 20 percent of 
consensus recommendations are not recommending buying. This may partially be a result of selection 
bias discussed above, leading to over-representation of large investment banks. However, also, the 




Descriptive Statistics on the Level of Analyst Recommendations and Coverage 
Panel A presents consensus recommendation, by years after the IPO. Recommendations are classified as follows: 1 
(Strong Buy), 2 (Buy), 3 (Hold), 4 (Sell) and 5 (Strong Sell). First is a total number of recommendations in the range 
presented above. (In parentheses) is recommendations in the range, as a percentage of total number of recommendations 
issued during the range of Years after the IPO in question.  
 
Panel B presents lead underwriter recommendation and neglected stocks, by years after the IPO. Recommendations are 
classified as follows: 1 (Strong Buy), 2 (Buy), 3 (Hold), 4 (Sell) and 5 (Strong Sell). First is a total number of 
recommendations in the range presented above. (In parentheses) is recommendations in the range, as a percentage of total 




although the amount of distinctly favorable recommendations decreases over time, the number of 
unfavorable recommendations remains at a relatively low level throughout the examination period. 
This may be explained by conventional wisdom that analysts are reluctant to issue unfavorable 
recommendations and more likely drop the coverage instead. Worth of notion is relatively high 




After merging the IPO data with recommendations data, I construct portfolios based on consensus 
and underwriter recommendations in order to determine whether analysts can forecast post-IPO stock 
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performance. The holding period of a stock is the three subsequent years of the IPO for portfolios 
based on both consensus and underwriter ratings. Three subsequent years is chosen to be an original 
holding period since it is used by several researchers examining post-IPO long-term performance.7 
However, also other holding periods are examined. 
 
As discussed before, consensus recommendation is a mean recommendation provided by Thomson 
Reuters IBES database. Each firm with an existing consensus recommendation 𝐴𝑖𝜏 is placed into one 
of four portfolios as of the close of the trading day 𝜏 − 1. The portfolio named as Consensus 1 consists 
of the most highly recommended stocks, those for which 1.00 ≤ 𝐴𝑖𝜏−1  ≤ 1.50. For Consensus 2 to 
4 is used criteria as follows, respectively: 1.50 <  𝐴𝑖𝜏−1  ≤ 2.00 ; 2.00 <  𝐴𝑖𝜏−1  ≤ 2.50 ; 𝐴𝑖𝜏−1  >
2.50. The approach is similar to the one used by Barber et al. (2001) with an exception that there is 
not fifth portfolio, for which 𝐴𝑖𝜏−1  > 3.00 and the fourth and fifth portfolios are combined. Reason 
for combining them is that, as can be observed from the Table IV, the amount of stocks for which 
𝐴𝑖𝜏−1  > 3.00 is considerably small. 
 
In turn, every stock with a valid lead underwriter recommendation 𝐵𝑖𝜏 is placed into one of three 
portfolios, again, as of the close of trading on date 𝜏 − 1 . There is only one lead underwriter 
recommendation for each firm at time and therefore the criteria for constructing underwriter 
recommendation portfolios is different. The portfolio named as Underwriter 1 consists of stocks with 
a ‘Strong Buy’ lead underwriter rating. Respectively, Underwriter 2 includes stocks with a ‘Buy’ 
recommendation and Underwriter 3 is formed of stocks for which 𝐵𝑖𝜏−1 ≥ 3. Of course, the criteria 
differing between consensus and underwriter portfolios may cause some biases when comparing the 
performance of underwriters and consensus. However, both the most and least favorable portfolios 
are comparable in a sense that Consensus 1 consists of stocks having more weight by ‘Strong Buys’ 
whereas ‘Holds’, ‘Sells’ and ‘Strong Sells’ have most weight on stocks in Consensus 4 portfolio. 
 
Moreover, two additional portfolios are constructed in order to address potential biases. I construct a 
portfolio for neglected stocks in order to examine whether analysts’ decision to not follow certain  
 
                                               
7 E.g. Ritter (1991) documents an average cumulative matching firm-adjusted return of -15.08% in 3 years following 




Descriptive Statistics on Portfolios, Original Portfolios 
Consensus 1 to 4 are consensus portfolios. The criteria for stocks being included in the portfolio is respectively 1 to 4: 
1 ≤ 𝐴𝑖𝜏−1  ≤ 1.50 ; 1.50 <  𝐴𝑖𝜏−1  ≤ 2.00 ; 2.00 <  𝐴𝑖𝜏−1  ≤ 2.50 ;  𝐴𝑖𝜏−1  > 2.50. Underwriter 1 to 3 are underwriter 
portfolios. The criteria for stocks being included in the portfolio is respectively 1 to 3: 𝐵𝑖𝜏 = 1 ;  𝐵𝑖𝜏 = 2 ; 𝐵𝑖𝜏 ≥ 3. 
Neglected stocks is stocks which have been started to trade publicly in the previous three years and are neglected or the 
coverage has been dropped during the year in question and obtain daily security data on Compustat North America 
Security database. 
 
Panel A exhibits number of stocks in portfolios as daily average, by year. First is presented daily average of the number 
of stocks in portfolio in the year in question. Second, (in parentheses) is daily average of the number of stocks in portfolio, 
as a percentage of daily average of all stocks in any portfolio of its type. For neglected stocks this percentage (in 
parentheses) is a percentage of all companies which have undertaken IPO during the three previous years and obtains 
daily security data on Compustat North America Daily Security database.  
 




firms is rationalized by weaker stock returns. That is, the existing research suggests that it is 
conventional wisdom that analysts rather shy away the coverage than issue negative ratings. In 
addition, also a portfolio including all sample stocks with a data of daily returns available in the 




Table V presents descriptive statistics on original portfolios with a holding period of the three years 
following the IPO. Three observations are made on the Panel A exhibiting number of stocks of each 
portfolio throughout the examination period of nine years. First, the allocation between portfolios is 
rather consistent over time. However, as the holding period is the three years following the IPO, 
significantly smaller number of stocks in every portfolio in 2010 to 2013, can be observed. Second, 
the most weight, in terms of number of stocks, is on portfolios in the middle, meaning that there is 
not overly many ‘Strong buys’ or unfavorable ratings. Third, a percentage of neglected stocks of the 
sample is relatively high moving around its average of 17%. 
 
Panel B exhibits average market values of stocks in each portfolio. There are two characteristics for 
portfolios. First, both consensus and underwriter analysts allocate relatively small stocks, measured 
by market value, into the most highly ranked portfolios. However, when it comes to consensus 
recommendations, also least favorably recommended stocks are relatively small in market value 
whereas underwriters do not make a distinction in market values between portfolios two and three. 
Second, again presumably resulting from the potential selection bias, firms in underwriter portfolios, 
in general, are larger in relation to firms in consensus portfolios. However, if this affects returns, they 






When the composition of each seven portfolios is determined, the value-weighted return for date 𝜏 is 
calculated based on the daily returns provided by the Compustat North America Daily Security 
database. The equation for determining this return 𝑅𝑝𝜏 for portfolio 𝑝 is: 
 







𝑥𝑖𝜏−1 = the weight, which is the market value of company 𝑖 as of the close of trading on 
date 𝜏 − 1 divided by the aggregate market value of all companies in portfolio 𝑝 as of 
the close of that trading day 
𝑅𝑖𝜏 = the return of the stock of company 𝑖 on date 𝑡, and 
𝑛𝑝𝜏−1 = the number of firms in portfolio 𝑝 at the close of trading on date 𝑡 − 1 
 
The value-weighted return is chosen since it requires less rebalancing, consequently reduces 
transaction costs and enables me to examine whether investment strategy based on post-IPO analyst 
recommendations is profitable. Moreover, as Barber et al. (2001) state value-weighted returns are 
economically more significant, as the stock returns of large firms are represented with more weight 
than the returns of small firms. 
 
Next, I calculate monthly returns 𝑅𝑝𝑡 for each portfolio by compounding daily returns over the 𝑛 
trading days of the month, as the following equation presents: 
 




In order to examine whether analysts can forecast post-IPO stock performance, I employ intercept 
tests. First, I run regressions using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The equation is the 
following: 
 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = ∝𝑝+  𝛽𝑝(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + ∈𝑝𝑡, 
where 
𝑅𝑓𝑡 = The “risk-free” return on 1 month Treasury bill of month 𝑡 
𝑅𝑚𝑡 = The return on the market, value-weighted return of all CRSP firms incorporated in the  
US and listed on the NYSE, AMEX or Nasdaq 
∝𝑝 = The estimated intercept (Jensen’s alpha) of portfolio 




Second, I use the five-factor model developed by Fama and French (1993). The five-factor model is 
employed in order to adjust portfolio returns for five widely-acknowledged risk factors. I estimate 
the following monthly time-series regression: 
 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = ∝𝑝+  𝛽𝑝(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑝𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + ∈𝑝𝑡, 
 
where 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 = The size premium. Nine value-weighted portfolios of small stocks minus nine of large 
stocks in a month 𝑡. 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡= The value premium. Two value weighted portfolios of high book-to-market stocks 
minus two of low book-to-market in a month 𝑡 
𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡= Two value weighted portfolios of robust operating profitability firms minus two of 
weak operating profitability in a month 𝑡 
𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡= Two value-weighted portfolios of conservatively investing firms minus two of 
aggressively investing firms8 
 
Moreover, the regression returns parameter estimates of 𝑠𝑝 , ℎ𝑝 , 𝑟𝑝 and 𝑐𝑝 for each portfolio. These 
coefficient estimates provides a base for interpretations on portfolio characteristics when discussed 
in the Results-section. If a value of 𝛽𝑝 is higher (lower) than one it indicates that the portfolio, and 
stocks contributing to it, are on average riskier (less risky) than the market. Also, other factors 
contributes to the interpretation of potential excess returns. A positive (negative) value of 𝑠𝑝 implies 
a tilt towards small (large) stocks whereas a value of ℎ𝑝 greater (lower) than zero indicates a portfolio 
tilted towards value (growth) stocks. Correspondingly, if a regression returns a positive (negative) 
coefficient estimate of 𝑟𝑝, signifies that a portfolio has more weight on stocks obtaining robust (weak) 
operating performance. Finally, a value of 𝑐𝑝 greater (lower) than zero implies a portfolio including 
firms with conservative (aggressive) investment policies.  
 
                                               
8 All these factors are from Fama and French (1993). More information can be found in Fama and French (1993). I 





Table VI exhibits estimated portfolio coefficients for the Fama-French 5-factor model. The bottom 
line reveals characteristics for newly public firms in general, by presenting coefficient estimates of 
the value-weighted portfolio of all sample stocks. The holding period is consistently three years. 
 
First, the sample portfolio seems to obtain negative and significant RMW and CMA coefficients 
indicating that newly public companies have weaker operating profitability and they proceed into 
more aggressive investments than US companies on average. These are more or less inherent 
attributes to IPOs but still there is variation among portfolios in coefficient estimates of RMW and 
CMA. RMW estimates are more negative for consensus portfolios, but again this can be a result of 
possible selection bias of underwriter portfolios. However, both consensus and underwriters seem to 
be more likely to either strongly recommend buying, or not to buy, if operating profitability is weak. 
Nevertheless, after controlling for sample selection, this attribute is more pronounced for consensus 
portfolios than underwriter portfolios.9 Furthermore, consensus appears to be more favorable towards 
firms with aggressive investment policies which is in conflict with the rationale behind the model. 
 
Second, All Sample Stocks Portfolio’s SMB and HML coefficient estimates demonstrates that the 
sample is tilted towards small growth stocks, which is again consistent with the character of IPOs. 
Affiliated analysts appear to be more likely to base their ratings on HML factor as there is no clear 
distribution or trend among Consensus portfolios when it comes to HML estimates. That is, 
underwriter analysts are more likely to issue unfavorable (favorable) recommendations for growth 
(value) firms having low (high) book-to-market ratio. 
 
When comparing covered stocks to neglected stocks, Table VI reveals that neglected stocks are 
significantly less risky than market and tilted towards stocks with aggressive investment policies. In 
turn, covered stocks seem to have significantly weaker operating profitability and they are more  
 
                                               
9 I construct consensus portfolios which include exclusively the stocks which have an underwriter recommendation to 
control for selection bias. RMW estimates for these Consensus 1 and Consensus 2 are -2.53 and -1.42 with a t-values of  




Portfolio Coefficient Estimates for Fama-French Five-Factor Model  
This table provides coefficient estimates for several portfolios. Consensus 1 to 4 are consensus portfolios and 
Consensus 1 – Consensus 4 is a zero-investment long-short portfolio purchasing Consensus 1 and selling 
short Consensus 4. Underwriter 1 to 3 are consensus portfolios and Underwriter 1 – Underwriter 3 is a zero-
investment long-short portfolio purchasing Underwriter 1 and selling short Underwriter 3. All covered is a 
value-weighted portfolio including all stocks with a valid analyst coverage. Neglected is value-weighted 
portfolio including all stocks without analyst coverage. All covered – Neglected is a zero-investment long-
short portfolio purchasing All covered and selling short Neglected. All sample stocks is a value-weighted 
portfolio comprising of all sample stocks. 
 
Rm-Rf (excess market return), SMB (Small-Minus-Big), HML (High Minus Low), RMW (Robust-Minus-
Weak) and CMA (Conservative-Minus-Aggressive) all are coefficient estimates for portfolios (with t-values 






Figure 1. Annualized geometric mean gross returns for portfolios formed based on consensus and 
underwriter analyst recommendations, 2010 to 2018.  
 
exposed to factors indicating that covered stocks are mostly small stocks with low book-to-market 
ratio. Again, both portfolios have a holding period of the three years following the IPO. 
 
Figure 1 provides a visualization of annual portfolio returns which are gross of any transaction costs. 
Annualized return of a value-weighted market portfolio, comprising of stocks traded in NASDAQ, 
NYSE and AMEX, is 11.8 percent. The portfolio consisting of most favorable consensus 
recommendations [1.00-1.50] yields annual gross return of 5.0 percent whereas Consensus 2 
[recommendations of 1.50-2.00] produces surprisingly as much as 22.4 percent of raw return. In turn, 
the raw return of Consensus 3 [recommendations of 2.00-2.50] equals to the return of most favorable 
consensus recommendations, 5.0 percent. Thus, at least in terms of positive annual raw returns there 
is considerable variation between portfolio groups. Moreover, when it comes to raw returns, even 
neglected stocks seems to outperform most favorably recommended stocks. However, the least 
favorably ranked stocks yield annual gross return of -1.9 percent and Consensus 2 seems to 
outperform market significantly in terms of raw returns. The outperformance of Consensus 2 
compared with Consensus 1 may be partially explained by monthly updates of consensus data, 
especially if Consensus 1 does not capture the returns “belonging to it” due to the delay in updating. 
6.4 percent of Consensus 1 recommendations are upgrades from Consensus 2 and a maximum delay 
is one month. Therefore, returns for combined portfolio of Consensus 1 and Consensus 2 are 
presented below in order to address a potential bias arising from the less frequent updating. In turn, 
26 
 
underwriter portfolios produce annual gross returns of 10.2 percent, 12.6 percent and 2.0 percent, 
denoting first most favorable recommendations, and least favorable ones last. Returns of neglected 
stocks and all sample stocks are 12.9 percent and 11.5 percent, respectively, when holding period is 
corresponding to analyst portfolios.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, to examine whether analyst recommendations possess 
investment value, I employ intercept tests using both the CAPM and the Fama-French five-factor 
models. By doing that, I adjust returns for multiple risk factors. Also, long-short portfolios, which 
purchase (sell short) most (least) favorable stocks, are included in order to examine the investment 
value. Table VII presents the results of these intercept tests. Still, neither one of the long-short 
portfolios does not provide statistically significant abnormal returns. Long-short portfolio based on 
consensus recommendations yield monthly excess return of 1.1 percent from Fama-French five-factor 
model and an equivalent portfolio based on underwriter recommendations, in turn, produces 0.6 
percent of monthly abnormal return. This is an indication of predictive power of analyst 
recommendations but due to its statistical insignificance, the null hypothesis that analysts do not 
possess an ability to predict post-IPO stock performance cannot be rejected. It is also remarkable that, 
portfolio of neglected stocks yields monthly excess return of 0.6. This suggests that analysts’ selection 
to not cover certain firms is not explained by their performance. 
 
However, Consensus 2 yields monthly excess return of 0.9 percent (significant at the level of 10%) 
and Underwriter 2 earns (insignificant) excess return of 0.2 percent, which both are higher than excess 
returns of most highly ranked portfolios. This finding suggests that purchasing stocks accompanied 
with a recommendation of lower than or equal to 2 (‘Strong Buy’ and ‘Buy’) and selling short stocks 
having a recommendation of higher than 2.50 (‘Hold’, ‘Sell’ and ‘Strong Sell’) could be a profitable 
investment strategy. I examined that by combining two most favorable portfolios for both consensus 
and underwriter recommendations. Note that when it comes to consensus recommendations the 
outperformance of Consensus 2 compared with Consensus 1 may also be partially a result of delayed 








Returns on Original Portfolios, Holding Period of 3 Years 
This table exhibits returns and intercepts for multiple portfolios. Annual Raw Return is annualized 
gross return of portfolio without any adjustments. Intercept from is an estimate of ∝𝑝  for given 
portfolio from given regression model (with t-values underneath in parentheses). *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, responsibly. Annualized excess return from is 
annualized alpha of given portfolio and regression model.  
 
 
Returns for these combined portfolios, and long-short portfolios constructed based on them, are 
presented in the Table VIII. The table exhibits statistically significant (at a significance level of 5%) 
positive monthly abnormal return of 1.6 percent for consensus long-short portfolio. This result is 






Returns on Combined Portfolios, Holding Period of 3 Years 
This table provides returns for several portfolios. Consensus 1 + 2 is a combined portfolio of 
consensus portfolios Consensus 1 and Consensus 2. (Consensus 1+2) – Consensus 4 is a zero-
investment long-short portfolio purchasing Consensus 1 + 2 and selling short Consensus 4. In 
turn, Underwriter 1 + 2 is a combined portfolio of underwriter portfolios Underwriter 1 and 
Underwriter 2. (Underwriter 1+2) – Underwriter 3 is a zero-investment long-short portfolio 
purchasing Underwriter 1 + 2 and selling short Underwriter 3.  
 
Annual Raw Return is annualized gross return of portfolio without any adjustments. Intercept 
from is an estimate of ∝𝑝  for given portfolio from given regression model (with t-values 
underneath in parentheses). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 





returns below 5th percentile to the 5th percentile.10 This indicates that consensus recommendations 
predict post-IPO stock returns in the three years following the IPO when recommendations in a range 
of 1.00 – 2.00 are considered as ‘(Strong) Buy’s and recommendations greater than 2.50 as ‘Hold’s, 
‘Sell’s or ‘Strong Sell’s. That finding suggests to reject the null hypothesis that analyst 
recommendations do not possess predictive power on post-IPO stock returns. However, the excess 
return of combined long-short portfolio formed based on underwriter recommendations, is 
statistically insignificant 0.7 percent. 
 
                                               
10 The monthly abnormal return and t-value from the Fama-French five-factor model are 2.1% and 2.936, respectively. 
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Long-short portfolio based on consensus recommendations outperform underwriter long-short 
portfolio in both combined and non-combined forms of portfolios after adjusting for risk factors. 
Therefore, higher raw return of original underwriter long-short portfolio indicates that the returns of 
underwriter portfolios are attributed to widely-acknowledged anomalies which are captured by five 
factors developed by Fama and French (1993). The coefficient estimates, presented in the Table VI, 
illustrate this, as underwriters issue more negative recommendations to firms with aggressive 
investment policies and to firms obtaining low book-to-market ratio. By doing the latter, they 
recommend according to the well-acknowledged value anomaly. Correspondingly, favorable 
consensus recommendations are tilted towards firms undertaking aggressive investments which, on 
average, earn inferior returns to the returns of firms obtaining conservative investment policies.  
 
Therefore, after controlling for these factors, consensus recommendations appear to outperform 
underwriter analysts’ recommendations in the ability to predict post-IPO stock performance. That is 
to say, consensus recommendations possess more investment value than underwriter 
recommendations. Moreover, after combining two most favorable portfolios, consensus 
recommendations are able to produce positive and significant abnormal returns whereas the excess 
return of affiliated analysts is positive but far off significant. Thus, I cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the predictive power of underwriter analysts’ recommendations is inferior to consensus 
recommendations. However, both abnormal returns are gross of transaction costs, and may not result 
in positive abnormal returns after subtracting transaction costs resulting from frequent rebalancing. 
 
Moreover, different holding periods are tested. All the results of the intercept tests for multiple 
different holding periods are presented in the Appendix II. In addition to the original holding period 
of three years, the holding periods are: the first year following the IPO, the three years after 
conducting IPO excluding the first year and the five subsequent years of the IPO. Only most favorable 
and least favorable portfolios are presented in addition to the long-short portfolios. This totals for 18 
different additional portfolios.  
 
These different holding periods reveals a remarkable finding. The predictive power of analyst 
recommendations is most pronounced for analyst recommendations during the first subsequent year 
of the IPO. During the first year after the IPO, the long-short portfolio, obtaining long and short 
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positions respectively in Consensus 1 and Consensus 4 portfolios, earns abnormal monthly return of 
2.5 percent with a significance level of 5%.11 For long-short portfolio formed based on underwriter 
recommendations respectively, monthly abnormal return is 0.7 percent, and this is not statistically 
significant. However, all these portfolios consist of very limited amount of stocks at time and thus 
this effect should be examined by e.g. expanding the sample to cover also other geographic areas in 
order to make robust conclusions.12 Furthermore, the returns of portfolios with a holding period of 
the three subsequent years excluding the first year, are inferior to the returns of original portfolios.  
 
Furthermore, as updating frequencies of consensus and underwriter data differs from each other and 
the sample of underwriter portfolio is more restricted, I construct portfolios which match by sample 
and timing. These portfolios are also presented in Appendix II. This robust check does not change 
findings when comparing consensus performance with underwriter performance. Still, the 
performance of consensus recommendations is better while the abnormal returns of underwriter 
recommendations nearly get wiped out after matching to the updating frequency of consensus 




The aim of this paper has been to examine whether analysts can forecast post-IPO stock performance. 
Moreover, the effect of underwriter analysts’ conflict of interest on the predictive power of their 
recommendations is of my interest.  
 
The predictive power is examined by constructing portfolios on stocks grouped on the base of ratings 
provided by both consensus recommendations and affiliated analysts. The performance of these post-
IPO recommendations is studied by constructing long-short portfolios which buy most highly rated 
stocks (a recommendation of 2.00 or lower) and sells short least favorably recommended ones. Then, 
                                               
11 This result remains significant after a 90% winsorization setting returns above the 95th percentile to the 95th percentile 
and returns below the 5th percentile to the 5th percentile. The monthly abnormal return and t-value from the Fama-
French five-factor are 2.9% and 2.704, respectively. 
12 E.g. Consensus 4 portfolio used in this robustness check includes two short periods of 5 to 10 trading days when there 
are no stocks at all in the portfolio. Maximum number of stocks in these portfolios at time is 70. 
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the performance of these long-short portfolios is measured by employing the five-factor model 
provided by Fama and French (1993). The investment strategy which groups stocks by the rate of 
consensus recommendation has been profitable, gross of transaction costs, over the 2010 to 2018 
period, and it has produced positive and significant abnormal monthly returns of 1.6 percent. 
Correspondingly, investing in accordance with underwriter recommendations has not generated 
significant excess returns from the Fama-French five-factor model.  
 
This study has three main findings. First, analysts can forecast post-IPO stock performance. Second, 
the investment value of underwriter analysts’ recommendations is inferior to consensus 
recommendations. Third, this predictive power of analyst recommendations on post-IPO stock 
performance appears to be most pronounced in the first subsequent year of the IPO. 
 
Although the relation between analyst recommendations and post-IPO stock performance is not 
covered in the existing research, Barber et al. (2001) find annual abnormal gross return greater than 
4 percent for long-short consensus portfolio similar to this research while the sample is not restricted 
to the IPO aftermarket. Their result requires daily rebalancing and timely response. This study does 
not assume daily rebalancing or timely response, but it finds annual abnormal gross return greater 
than 20 percent for stocks which have been listed in the three preceding years. The results are 
consistent with the findings of Barber et al. (2001) but suggests that the predictive power of consensus 
recommendations is more pronounced for newly public companies.  
 
Iskoz (2004) and furthermore Michaely and Womack (1999) documents the performance of ‘strong 
buy’ and ‘buy’ -recommendations issued by underwriter analysts inferior to the unaffiliated ‘strong 
buy’ and ‘buy’ –recommendations. This is consistent with my results. However, as an explanation 
for the inferior performance of affiliated analysts’, the existing research suggests overly favorable 
recommendations, especially ‘hold’ recommendations when ‘sell’ is warranted. 13  This is not a 
reliable explanation in the light of this study, as underwriter analysts are, on average, less favorable 
in their recommendations than consensus.  
 
                                               




Instead, the finding of O’Brien et al. (2005) may explain the inferior performance of underwriter 
analysts. They find that affiliated analysts are slower to downgrade from ‘buy’- and ‘hold’-
recommendations and significantly faster to upgrade from hold-recommendations. This may lead to 
lower return on their ‘buy’-recommendations compared with consensus recommendations. However, 
the quickness of recommendation changes of underwriters and non-underwriters should be examined 
further in this context. Also, underwriters in this study appear to base their recommendations on well-
acknowledged anomalies such as the value and size anomalies. Moreover, it is worth of notion that 
one of the limitations of this study, is rather restricted sample of lead-underwriter recommendations, 
resulting in the over-representation of large investment banks. 
 
Furthermore, the results are subject to certain limitations. As discussed above, the sample of the first 
subsequent year of the IPO is rather restricted. Thus, I suggest the future research to expand the 
geographic scope in order to examine reliably whether analysts possess superior predictive power on 
stock returns of the first subsequent year of the IPO. Moreover, if my finding that analyst 
recommendations’ predictive power is most pronounced for the returns in the first subsequent year 
of the IPO, the predictive power on long-term post-IPO stock performance (three years following the 
IPO) studied in this paper, may be affected by over-representation of the first year returns and 
recommendations. That is, 30.9 percent of the sample companies have undertaken the IPO during 
years 2016 to 2018, meaning that the holding period of the three subsequent years of the IPO used in 
this study, does not become covered for these stocks. Moreover, it is worth of notion that this study 
does not account for transaction costs and rather focuses on the predictive power of analyst 
recommendations. If the profitability of investment strategy following post-IPO analyst 
recommendations is examined, transaction costs should be included. 
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Description of the method for matching analysts to underwriters 
Appendix I introduces the method I use in order to match anonymous analyst recommendations to known lead-underwriters. Underlying assumptions for this 
method are the findings of the prior research, that underwriters nearly exclusively initiate the analyst coverage and are more likely to continue the coverage over 
time in order to boost the performance of their clients. This may result to three conditions I examine. First, the large portion of lead-underwriter’s equity research 
is concentrating on firms they have taken public. Second, the recommendations issued on the firm that the underwriter Y has taken public are concentrated on the 
equity department of lead-underwriter. Third, the largest portion of coverage initiations of the firm that the underwriter Y has taken public, is initiated by the 
equity department of lead-underwriter. As a prerequisite for a match, is used that all these conditions become realized. I construct three 13x14 matrixes and 
examine the relations between research houses X and underwriters Y in order to find analyst-underwriter matches. 10 underwriter-analyst pairs that are matched 
in this research, are underlined and bolded.  
 














Returns for Combined Portfolios, Holding Period of 3 Years 
This table provides returns for several portfolios with different holding periods. Moreover, Panel D exhibits returns on both consensus and underwriter 
portfolios matched by timing and sample. 
 
Annual Raw Return is annualized gross return of portfolio without any adjustments. Intercept from is an estimate of ∝𝑝 for given portfolio from given 
regression model (with t-values underneath in parentheses). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, responsibly. Annualized excess 
return from is annualized alpha of given portfolio and regression model. 
 
